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INTRODUCTION 
It is estimated that sixty-eight percent of adults in the United States 
own and use a smartphone.1 These devices have brought with them incredible 
efficiency and convenience, but those benefits are not without new 
complications. Seemingly ever more at the forefront of both political and 
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 1. Monica Anderson, Technology Device Ownership: 2015, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 29, 
2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/10/29/technology-device-ownership-2015/. 
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technological debate is the concern of individual privacy, and the extent to 
which the government may intrude upon that privacy. 
A novel legal question has been sparked by the existence of an 
emergency function (“Emergency”) built into smartphones which allows a 
person, without knowing or contravening the phone’s passcode, to make a 
call to any number. The Emergency button shows on the phone’s lock screen 
and, when pressed, provides access, not only to a user’s pre-loaded Medical 
ID information, but also to a dialing screen to be used for calling 911. The 
primary purpose of Emergency is safety—should a smartphone’s user be 
incapacitated for any reason, a bystander can pick up that person’s phone and 
get in touch with emergency services, regardless of whether the user locks 
their phone with a passcode. 
While there are many obvious safety benefits to this technology, the 
ability to dial out from the phone in this way raises new legal issues. 
Particularly, would police use of the Emergency function on a lawfully-
seized smartphone qualify as a search for purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment? Should officers be required to secure a warrant before being 
able to use the functionality in pursuit of a criminal suspect? 
This issue was recently raised in a California court during a criminal 
case against Matthew Muller, who was on trial for burglarizing a home.2 
Allegedly, Muller was stealing from the home when he was confronted by 
the homeowner and fled, but not before dropping his iPhone.3 Police 
recovered the phone and used the Emergency function to call 911—
inherently giving the number associated with the phone to the 911 operator.4 
Officers got the phone number from 911 and determined the service 
provider.5 At this point, they obtained a warrant, allowing police to get 
Muller’s identification from the provider.6 
At trial, Muller argued that the evidence obtained from the phone 
should be excluded because police use of the Emergency function was an 
illegal search.7 Ultimately, this issue was not decided. The judge determined 
that the phone in this particular case was abandoned property, and therefore 
Muller had no privacy interest in it.8 The question remains as to whether this 
                                                 
 2. Orin Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to Placing Calls from a Locked Phone 
to Identify its Owner, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 22, 2016), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/06/22/applying-the-fourth-
amendment-to-placing-calls-from-a-locked-phone-to-identify-its-owner/?utm_term
=.6746bfbc9851. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Rina Nakano, Judge Rules Cell Phone Will Remain as Evidence in Kidnapping 
Case Against Matthew Muller, FOX 40 (June 23, 2016, 4:22 PM), http://fox40.com/2016/
06/23/judge-rules-cell-phone-will-remain-as-evidence-in-kidnapping-case-against-matthew-
muller/. 
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could constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment under a different set 
of circumstances, however. 
In determining whether an officer’s use of the Emergency function 
of a phone is a search, it is important first to lay a foundation for why the 
Constitution provides protection against searches in the first place. Part I of 
this Note will provide a brief overview of why the Fourth Amendment was 
adopted, and what rights it is intended to protect. Next, it is impossible to 
know whether use of Emergency would qualify as a search unless we know 
how a search is defined. Part II of this Note will examine the tests that have 
developed over the years, namely the Katz test and the Jones test, which give 
the prevailing framework for determining whether a search has taken place. 
Part III will show how these tests have been adapted and made applicable to 
modern technology in our digital age. Technology has presented courts with 
a variety of legal issues to sort through and, though the question of 
Emergency use has not been settled at a circuit court level, related issues have 
already found their way into appellate jurisdiction. In Part IV, this Note will 
give a summation of what have come to be called the “MagStripe” cases, and 
will show how the legal questions at issue in those cases could come to bear 
heavily on the fate of Emergency use in future prosecutions. To conclude, 
Part V will address how the culmination of the case law indicates that police 
use of Emergency is not a search under the Fourth Amendment. 
I.  FOURTH AMENDMENT ORIGINS 
An analysis of whether a police officer’s use of the Emergency 
function on a smartphone constitutes a search cannot be undertaken without 
first obtaining an understanding of why the Constitution protects against 
searches, and what kind of rights and interests are included under this 
protection. 
The Constitution provides, “The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated.”9 The origins of the Fourth Amendment “grew 
directly out of the events which immediately preceded the revolutionary 
struggle with England.”10 King Henry VIII had combined the government’s 
power to search along with a licensing system to constrain the freedom of the 
press in England.11 This arose from the publication of articles “attacking not 
only governmental policies but the King himself.”12 It was not until later in 
the 1600’s that the English people began adopting the belief that “the public 
                                                 
 9. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 10. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT § 1.1(a) (5th ed. Supp. 2016). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Meghan Totten, Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis, and 
Interpretation – Centennial Edition, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE, 
1377-78 (June 27, 2016), https://www.congress.gov/content/conan/pdf/GPO-CONAN-REV-
2016.pdf. 
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had a right to be safeguarded” from this kind of activity.13 Professor LaFave14 
notes the words of William Pitt which summarize the heart of this movement: 
The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the 
force of the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the 
wind may blow through it; the storm may enter; the rain may 
enter; but the King of England may not enter; all his force 
dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement.15 
For colonials in particular, the Fourth Amendment represented 
“protection against the use of the ‘writs of assistance.’”16 These writs were 
issued by the Crown allowing officers to enter a premises and search for 
goods that may have been smuggled into the colonies.17 Opposition to the 
writs was led by James Otis, whose unsuccessful attempts to defeat the writs 
paved the way for James Madison, who proposed that a clause nearly 
identical to the finalized Fourth Amendment be included in the 
Constitution.18 
Now that we have a background for why the Fourth Amendment was 
enacted, what exactly was it meant to protect against? Simply put, it is a 
barrier, a hurdle that must be overcome before a government actor may 
intrude upon certain enumerated areas of individual privacy—the 
aforementioned “persons, houses, papers, and effects.”19 Generally speaking, 
that is going to include your smartphone, and more importantly, the data 
contained within your smartphone. 
What kind of hurdle is created? Courts have held that “the ultimate 
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’”20 More 
specifically, within the context of a search, “reasonableness” is typically 
going to require obtaining a warrant.21 Warrants naturally slow down an 
officer’s investigative process, but that is a price the judicial system is willing 
to pay in order to uphold the privacy interests recognized in the Constitution. 
The value of a warrant is its insertion of “the judgment of an independent 
magistrate between law enforcement officers and the privacy of citizens.”22 
Unlike early seventeenth-century England, the Constitution places such 
importance on the individual right to privacy (though the extent is yet to be 
                                                 
 13. LaFave, supra note 10, § 1.1(a) (quoting Nelson B. Lasson, The History and 
Development of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 38-39 (1937)). 
        14.   Professor Wayne LaFave is the author of the treatise Search and Seizure, and is a 
noted scholar on the Fourth Amendment. 
 15. Id. (quoting Nelson B. Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, 49-50 (1937)). 
 16. Totten, supra note 12, at 1378. 
 17. Id. 
 18. LaFave, supra note 10, § 1.1(a). 
 19. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 20. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). 
 21. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014). 
 22. Totten, supra note 12 at 1399. 
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fully determined) that it is willing to impede public investigation, and 
consequently the search for truth, in an aim to uphold that privacy. 
There are, however, circumstances in which our justice system has 
determined that the warrant requirement can be circumvented. A balancing 
test is applied in which courts “determine whether to exempt a given type of 
search from the warrant requirement ‘by assessing, on the one hand, the 
degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, 
the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental 
interests.’”23 Examples of legitimate governmental interests include officer 
safety and avoiding the loss or destruction of evidence.24 To the extent there 
is a threat to officer safety or evidence, the warrant requirement is less likely 
to be waived. 
The Fourth Amendment was enacted to protect the privacy of 
individuals and their possessions. This protection extends to smartphones and 
the data contained therein. And the protection is triggered any time a 
government actor conducts a search of that smartphone. In our hypothetical 
situation in which an officer uses the Emergency function of a suspect’s 
smartphone without a warrant, three of the main requirements for a Fourth 
Amendment violation are clearly met. We have a government actor (police 
officer) and a protected piece of personal property (a smartphone). 
Furthermore, no warrant has been obtained by the government actor. The 
only remaining question is whether there has been a search. How do we know 
when a search has been conducted? 
II.  DEFINING A “SEARCH” 
This section will summarize how courts have come to define a search 
for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Traditionally, searches were heavily 
tied to physical trespass theory, but modern courts have adopted a more 
expansive view. Two cases in particular establish the framework under which 
a particular government action must be scrutinized to determine if there has 
been a search—Katz v. United States25 and United States v. Jones26. Katz was 
decided in 1967, and there have been many cases since then that apply and 
interpret its holding and test. Jones, on the other hand, was decided in 2012, 
and the extent of its impact remains to be seen. 
A search is broadly defined as “an infringement of an expectation of 
privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable.”27 A search can take 
many different forms, but it will typically involve some exertion of force, 
whether large or small.28 It includes “some exploratory investigation, . . . a 
                                                 
 23. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484. 
 24. Id. at 2485. 
 25. See 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 26. See 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
 27. 79 C.J.S. Searches § 6 (2016).  See also Katz 389 U.S. 347 (1967).  
 28. LaFave, supra note 10, § 2.1(a). 
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looking for or seeking out.”29 In contrast, “a truly cursory inspection—one 
that involves merely looking at what is already exposed to view, without 
disturbing it—is not a ‘search’ for Fourth Amendment purposes.”30 
Additionally, because the Fourth Amendment protection “extends to 
governmental action only,” courts have held that “once an individual’s 
expectation of privacy in particular information has been frustrated by a 
private individual, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit law 
enforcement’s subsequent use of that information, even if obtained without a 
warrant.”31 
A. Katz v. United States 
The first of the tests that is applied to determine whether a particular 
police action constitutes a search is the Katz test. Prior to Katz, a lack of 
physical penetration into someone’s privacy was dispositive in determining 
that a search had not taken place.32 However, courts began to take the view 
that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,” and therefore a 
search could potentially take place without physical intrusion.33 
In Katz, the defendant was charged with conducting an interstate 
gambling business via telephone.34 He was apprehended when FBI agents 
“attached an electronic listening and recording device to the outside of the 
public telephone booth from which he had placed his calls.”35 The lower 
courts ruled that there was no search, because the agents had not physically 
intruded upon the phone booth.36 
The United States Supreme Court reversed, saying, “once it is 
recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects people—and not simply 
‘areas’—against unreasonable searches and seizures it becomes clear that the 
reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a 
physical intrusion into any given enclosure.”37 The court went further by 
saying, “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own 
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what 
                                                 
 29. Id. 
 30. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 328 (1987) (holding that “the distinction between 
‘looking’ at a suspicious object in plain view and ‘moving it even a few inches’ is much 
more than trivial for purposes of the Fourth Amendment”). 
 31. United States v. Sparks, 806 F.3d 1323, 1334 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding that the 
unwarranted search of a cell phone did not violate Fourth Amendment protections because 
the phone was found, unlocked, at a Walmart, and the police search of the phone did not 
extend beyond that conducted by private citizens who found the phone). 
 32. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352. 
 33. Id. at 351. 
 34. Id. at 348. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 348-49. 
 37. Id. at 353. 
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he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may 
be constitutionally protected.”38 
It is from this principle that Justice Harlan, in his concurrence, 
iterated what has come to be known as the Katz test. Harlan’s concurrence is 
notable because “lower courts attempting to interpret and apply Katz quickly 
came to rely upon the Harlan elaboration, as ultimately did a majority of the 
Supreme Court.”39 Harlan noted that “there is a twofold requirement, first 
that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, 
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’”40 
The first prong of the test is somewhat problematic to enforce, as the 
Court takes the opportunity to dispose of previous standards without giving 
much substance to what the new standard actually is.41 It has been noted that 
the requirement of an actual expectation of privacy in the first prong opens 
the requirement up to being manipulated.42 “[T]he government could 
diminish each person’s subjective expectation of privacy merely by 
announcing half-hourly on television that . . . we were all forthwith being 
placed under comprehensive electronic surveillance.”43 As such, courts have 
warned that the first prong of the Katz test can provide an “inadequate index 
of Fourth Amendment protection.”44 Justice Harlan was satisfied that the 
defendant in Katz had fulfilled this part of the test by closing the door of the 
telephone booth.45 This simple action “entitled [Katz] to assume that his 
conversation is not being intercepted.”46 
The second prong is more objective because it takes into 
consideration the concerns of society as a whole. Professor LaFave believes 
that the “reasonableness” requirement embedded in the second prong was 
Justice Harlan’s attempt at “giv[ing] content to the word ‘justifiably’ in the 
majority’s assertion that eavesdropping on Katz was a search because it 
‘violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the 
telephone booth.’”47 How do we determine what is justifiable? 
Reasonableness is not enough—”it must be based on something in addition 
to a high probability of freedom from intrusion.”48 Justice Harlan would have 
us conduct a balancing test weighing the individual’s “sense of security” and 
                                                 
 38. Id. at 351 (internal citations omitted). 
 39. LaFave, supra note 10, § 2.1(b). 
 40. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361. 
 41. LaFave, supra note 10, § 2.1(b). 
 42. Id. § 2.1(c). 
 43. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. 
REV. 349, 384 (1973-1974). 
 44. LaFave, supra note 10, § 2.1(c). 
 45. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361. 
 46. Id. 
 47. LaFave, supra note 10, § 2.1(d). 
 48. Id. (quoting From Private Places to Personal Privacy: A Post Katz Study of 
Fourth Amendment Protection, 43. N.Y.U. L. REV. 968, 983 (1968)). 
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the necessity of the conduct as a means of efficient law enforcement.49 Yet 
again, we are asked to take a step back and view this from a societal 
perspective. To what extent is society prepared to give up its rights to privacy 
to facilitate efficient investigation of a crime? 
The Katz test’s expansive view of Fourth Amendment protection has 
been applied in many circumstances since its inception. For example, in 
Minnesota v. Olson, it was determined that a defendant had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in a home which was not his, but in which he was 
staying overnight.50 The Supreme Court took the very practical view that, 
“[an overnight guest] seeks shelter in another’s home precisely because it 
provides him with privacy, a place where he and his possessions will not be 
disturbed by anyone but his host and those his host allows inside.”51 In further 
support of a reasonable expectation, the Court acknowledged that “[w]e are 
at our most vulnerable when we are asleep because we cannot monitor our 
own safety or the security of our belongings.”52 The Court was unconcerned 
with the fact that the defendant had no legal interest in the actual dwelling.53 
Other Supreme Court justices have come to similar conclusions. In 
Rakas v. Illinois, the Court held “that a person can have a legally sufficient 
interest in a place other than his own home so that the Fourth Amendment 
protects him from unreasonable governmental intrusion into that place.”54  
Cases like this show just how expansive the applications of Katz have been, 
and how ready courts are to find a privacy interest. 
Regardless of the practical implementations of the Katz test, its 
general effect is viewed as one of expanding Fourth Amendment protection.55 
No longer must there be a physical intrusion by police officers in order for 
someone’s Fourth Amendment rights to be violated. 
B. United States. v. Jones 
Katz asked the question: Is a physical intrusion required for there to 
be a search? The answer was a resounding “no.” United States v. Jones came 
along over forty years later and asked: Is physical intrusion sufficient?56 
In Jones, Antoine Jones was suspected of dealing drugs, and 
government agents undertook various means of surveilling him.57 Among 
those methods was the installation of a GPS tracking device on the underside 
of Jones’ Jeep while it was parked in a public area.58 The device relayed 
                                                 
 49. Id. (quoting United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971)). 
 50. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96-97 (1990). 
 51. Id. at 99. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 142 (1978). 
 55. Amsterdam, supra note 43, at 385. 
 56. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 400. 
 57. Id. at 402. 
 58. Id. at 403. 
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information about Jones’ movement to officers, who compiled this 
information with other evidence in formulating charges against Jones of 
conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute cocaine.59 At 
the trial court level, the judge excluded evidence obtained from the GPS unit 
while it was parked at Jones’ home, but admitted evidence obtained while 
Jones was travelling in public places.60 The judge relied on the Katz holding 
by finding, “‘[a] person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares 
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place 
to another.’”61 
After a reversal of the conviction by the Court of Appeals, the 
Supreme Court upheld the reversal on the grounds that the attachment of the 
GPS device to Jones’ car constituted a search, and was therefore a violation 
of Jones’ Fourth Amendment rights.62 Justice Scalia expressed his 
understanding of the facts in the most simplified way possible: “The 
Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of 
obtaining information.”63 Leaning on the origin of the Bill of Rights, he went 
on to say, “[w]e have no doubt that such a physical intrusion would have been 
considered a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it 
was adopted.”64 
Using a textualist approach, Justice Scalia emphasized that the 
Fourth Amendment has always been closely connected to property and the 
pre-Katz search standards which revolved around trespass theory.65 While 
not overruling Katz, he pointed out that “the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-
privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law 
trespassory test.”66 He then clearly delineated, “we do not make trespass the 
exclusive test. Situations involving merely the transmission of electronic 
signals without trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis.”67 In a world 
in which so much of our lives involve the “transmission of electronic 
signals,” it is not hard to imagine that many situations will involve both the 
Jones and the Katz analysis. 
In order to qualify as a non-search, a government action must be able 
to pass both the Katz and Jones tests. Either test alone is sufficient to 
implicate an action as a search. These tests are fairly intuitive when applied 
to traditional concepts and physical items. But how have these tests 
(primarily Katz) adapted throughout the years of increased technological 
complexity and the vast, intangible, digital world that now comprises the 
majority of people’s lives? 
                                                 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983)). 
 62. Id. at 404. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 409 (emphasis in original). 
 67. Id. at 411. 
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III.  FOURTH AMENDMENT AND CELL PHONES (GENERALLY) 
This section will explore how courts have chosen to approach the 
application of tests, at least in regard to Katz, which were developed in an 
age with very little digital consideration, to the highly digital world in which 
we live today. The Supreme Court’s decision in Riley v. California 
exemplifies the current judicial attitude towards digital items which, in the 
days of Katz, had physical counterparts.68 
The Katz test has been constantly reexamined as new technologies 
provide complex considerations regarding privacy rights of individuals. Prior 
to the advent of smartphone technology, there was only so much private 
information that a person could carry around with them. Chief Justice 
Roberts has noted, “[m]ost people cannot lug around every piece of mail they 
have received for the past several months, every picture they have taken, or 
every book or article they have read—nor would they have any reason to 
attempt to do so.”69 However, modern cell phones, or “minicomputers,” as 
Justice Roberts aptly refers to them, are fully capable of doing just that.70 In 
Riley, the Supreme Court demonstrated the judiciary’s heightened scrutiny 
of searches involving smartphones and similar electronic devices.71 
Riley itself is a combination of two appeals, the first brought by 
David Riley appealing a warrantless search of his smartphone “looking for 
evidence, because . . . gang members will often video themselves with guns 
or take pictures of themselves with guns.”72 The search produced evidence 
which linked Riley to a car used in a previous shooting incident.73 The second 
case involved an appeal by Brima Wurie of police use of a “flip phone,” again 
without a warrant, to locate his apartment, wherein they found “crack 
cocaine, marijuana, drug paraphernalia, a firearm and ammunition, and 
cash.”74 
The Court began its analysis by distinguishing cases which had laid 
the previous groundwork for when a warrant was required for a search 
incident to an arrest. Chimel v. California established two central interests 
that weigh in favor of circumventing the warrant requirement: officer safety 
and the preservation of evidence.75 The Chimel analysis was applied in 
United States v. Robinson where Robinson was being pat down when an 
                                                 
 68. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2473. 
 69. Id. at 2489. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 2473. 
 72. Id. at 2480-81. 
 73. Id. at 2481. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 2483 (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (holding that it is 
reasonable for an officer “to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that 
the latter might seek to use,” and “search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person 
in order to prevent its concealment or destruction”)). 
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officer felt something in his coat pocket.76 The item turned out to be a 
“crumpled cigarette package,” and the officer proceeded to open it, finding 
capsules of heroin.77 The Robinson Court held this search unreasonable 
because it did not implicate either of the Chimel factors—”Robinson was 
unlikely to have evidence of the crime of arrest on his person,” and “it could 
not be justified as part of a protective search for weapons.”78 
But the Court refused to apply the Robinson and Chimel reasoning 
to searches regarding cell phones.79 Cell phones are a different animal. 
Searches of cell phones do not present comparable risks as those searches 
considered by Robinson and Chimel—“a search of the information on a cell 
phone bears little resemblance to the type of brief physical search considered 
in Robinson.”80 
In the Riley decision, Justice Roberts paints the picture of a person 
carting around a trunk filled with all of the personal items they had collected 
over the past several years.81 Cell phones represent not just the ability to carry 
around this extreme volume of information, but because of the “many distinct 
types of information—an address, a note, a prescription, a bank statement, a 
video—that reveal much more in combination than any isolated record,” cell 
phones could essentially allow for “[t]he sum of an individual’s private life 
to be reconstructed.”82 
There are other aspects of a cell phone search which troubled the 
Court. Particularly, the Court was disturbed by the pervasiveness present in 
a cell phone search as opposed to a physical search. Whereas, in the past, a 
“police officer searching an arrestee might have occasionally stumbled 
across a highly personal item such as a diary,” in today’s society, “it is no 
exaggeration to say that many of the more than 90% of American adults who 
own a cell phone keep on their person a digital record of nearly every aspect 
of their lives—from the mundane to the intimate.”83 In particular, the 
information exposed could include a “wealth of detail about her familial, 
political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”84 
Clearly, the Court was greatly concerned about both the quantity and 
quality of the information which could be exposed by a cell phone search. 
The concern for this type of information is not new, as Justice Roberts noted 
the Learned Hand quote from 1926, “that it is ‘a totally different thing to 
search a man’s pockets and use against him what they contain, from 
                                                 
 76. Id. at 2483 (citing United States v. Robinson, 414, U.S. 218 (1973)). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 2485. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 2489. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 2490. 
 84. Id. (quoting Jones, 565 U.S. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)). 
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ransacking his house for everything which may incriminate him.’”85 Smart 
phones and their progeny have simply made this information much more 
accessible to anyone who possesses them. Riley made clear that the 
accessibility of that information does not make it any less sacrosanct—“[t]he 
fact that technology now allows an individual to carry such information in 
his hand does not make the information any less worthy of the protection for 
which the Founders fought.”86 
Courts will clearly look beyond the label of “phone.” Smartphones 
will be treated similarly to computers or any other storage device capable of 
containing the intimate details of an individual’s life. How does this bear on 
the issue of Emergency functionality? To address that particular question, we 
must turn to more nuanced case law. Simply possessing someone’s phone is 
not the same as diving through the minutia of their calendar, email, and web 
browsing history. Just as the Court in Riley was concerned about the quantity 
and quality of information potentially exposed by a search, there must surely 
exist a spectrum of discoverable information. At some point along this 
spectrum the quantity of the information exposed is so great, or the quality 
of the information exposed so private, that courts will find a search has taken 
place. 
IV.  THE MAGSTRIPE CASES 
Where, on the spectrum, does the information at stake in our 
hypothetical case lie? What is the quality and quantity of information 
exposed when an officer utilizes Emergency? As will be discussed later in 
this section, though Professor Kerr87 and I disagree as to the holdings of the 
cases, we agree that the facts of the Emergency case align closely with the 
fact patterns of a group of cases currently being litigated through the circuit 
courts—the Magstripe Cases. 
The question at issue is whether there is a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the magnetic stripe (magstripe) of a credit card. Typically, the 
information contained in the magstripe is reflective of what is printed on the 
front of the card, i.e. name, account number, and expiration date.88 However, 
that information is capable of being reprogrammed to contain anything—
subject to a limit of 79 letters and 147 numbers.89 This is particularly useful 
to criminals who purchase stolen credit card data, but are not in possession 
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of the actual cards.90 As Professor Kerr points out, “the buyer can take an old 
credit card and re-encode the old card with information from the stolen credit 
card number. The buyer can then use the old credit card as if it were the stolen 
card.”91 
Law enforcement, upon lawfully retrieving what they believe to be 
stolen credit cards, can skim the information from the magstripe to see if it 
matches the information on the front of the card.92 If it does not match, they 
are alerted to some kind of fraud.93 But, is the skimming of the credit card 
information a Fourth Amendment search? The Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth 
Circuits have all weighed in on the issue and, though the three have come to 
similar conclusions, there is some speculation that a circuit split is in the 
making.94 
A. United States v. Bah 
The Sixth Circuit was the first to address this issue in United States 
v. Bah.95 Mamadou Bah and Allan Harvey were stopped by a police officer 
for speeding in a construction zone.96 A lawful search of their vehicle and 
their persons turned up eighty-six cards; including credit, debit, and gift 
cards.97 The officer, “without a warrant—then used a magnetic card reader, 
or “skimmer,” to read the information encoded on the magnetic strips of 
[some of the cards].”98 As expected, “a ‘majority, if not all’ of the magstripes 
had been re-encoded so that the financial information they contained did not 
match the information printed on the front and backs of the cards.”99 
Subsequent investigation showed that several of the accounts linked to the 
cards “had already incurred fraudulent charges.”100 
The trial court ruled that the evidence from the magstripes should not 
be excluded because “‘[a]n owner or possessor of a credit, debit, or gift card 
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the data encoded on the magnetic 
strip.’”101 The circuit court upheld the lower court’s holding regarding the 
magstripes, and it expounded with its own reasoning.102 Broadly, the circuit 
court held that “[n]o ‘search’ occurred when law enforcement read the 
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magnetic strips on the backs of the fraudulent cards because: (1) the scans 
did not involve a physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected area—as 
required under the trespass-based search analysis; and (2) the scans did not 
violate the cardholders’ reasonable expectation of privacy.”103 
Regarding the physical intrusion aspect, the court examined the 
decisions of Jones and Florida v. Jardines, both of which involved the 
government “physically intruding into an area.”104 This situation was distinct 
from those because “‘[s]liding a card through a scanner to read virtual data . 
. . does not involve’ any such physical invasions.”105 
In applying the Katz test, the court disregarded the argument of 
whether the men had a subjective expectation of privacy in the magstripes.106 
That issue was irrelevant because, as the court determined, “neither Bah nor 
Harvey [held] a reasonable expectation of privacy in the magnetic strips. . . . 
Such an expectation of privacy is not one that society is prepared to consider 
is reasonable.”107 The court was unwilling to recognize a reasonable privacy 
interest in the magnetic strips because they are “routinely read by private 
parties at gas stations, restaurants, and grocery stores to accelerate financial 
transactions.”108 The information on the strips, specifically the account 
number, “is routinely shared with cashiers every time the card is used.”109 
The court noted that “‘society is not prepared to accept as legitimate an 
asserted privacy interest in information that any member of the public may 
see.’”110 
Moreover, the court was not persuaded by the amount and kind of 
information that would potentially be exposed by such an action.111 It 
distinguished the Supreme Court’s ruling in Riley, regarding searches of cell 
phones, computers, and cassettes, on the basis that concerns regarding the 
quantity and quality of information exposed by those searches were not at 
issue here.112 Specifically, the court said “[t]he storage capacity of the 
magnetic strip of credit, debit, or gift card pales in comparison to that of a 
computer hard drive, cell phone, or even audiocassette,” “a reading of it . . . 
would not allow officers to reconstruct an individual’s private life,” and “[it] 
is not the highly personal information an individual would expect to keep 
private.”113 Furthermore, the information in the credit card “is intended to be 
read by third parties,” and “literally has no purpose other than to be provided 
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to others to facilitate financial transactions.”114 It was important to the court 
that the extent of the information to be exposed was known, and they 
withheld judgment regarding situations where either the contents of the 
device were truly unknown or where future storage capacity allowed for a 
much greater amount of private information to be stored on these kinds of 
cards.115 
B. United States v. DE L’Isle 
The case of United States v. DE L’Isle has many similarities to 
Bah.116 Just as in Bah, Eric-Arnaud Benjamin Briere DE L’Isle was pulled 
over for a routine traffic stop—following too closely to a semi-tractor 
trailer.117 The police officer smelled marijuana and lawfully obtained fifty-
nine credit, debit, and gift cards during his subsequent search of the 
vehicle.118 “DE L’Isle was charged with possession of fifteen or more 
counterfeit and unauthorized access devices,” and he moved to suppress the 
evidence gained from the skimming of the cards.119 DE L’Isle argued that the 
account information contained in the strip was the “type of information that 
the Supreme Court would consider a legitimate privacy interest.”120 
The discussion by the court was also similar to Bah; there was no 
physical intrusion into the card to offend the Jones test.121 In this case, 
however, the court addressed the issue of whether the defendant could have 
had a subjective expectation of privacy in the cards. The answer was ‘no’ 
because, “the purpose of a credit, debit, or gift card is to enable the holder of 
the card to make purchases, and to accomplish this, the holder must transfer 
information from the card to the seller, which negates an expressed privacy 
interest.”122 Similarly to Bah, this Court found that DE L’Isle had no 
expectation of privacy in the cards that society was prepared to accept as 
reasonable.123 
What sets DE L’Isle apart from Bah is the argument presented by the 
dissenting Judge Kelly in DE L’Isle.124 The dissent sought to remand the case 
in order to gather more information, but also took a starkly different approach 
to the expectation of privacy issues from the majority.125 
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Judge Kelly’s main concern was the ease with which one could re-
write the information contained on a magstripe.126 She invoked the 
“straightforward principle that law enforcement conducts a Fourth 
Amendment ‘search’ when it reads the contents of rewritable digital storage 
media.”127 Under Judge Kelly’s theory, to the extent that the magstripes are 
easily rewritable, they should be treated more like digital storage devices or 
mini-hard drives.128 “If a magnetic stripe card is a digital storage device, 
albeit one whose storage capacity is limited, . . . reading the data on it is a 
Fourth Amendment search.”129 She goes on to give examples of legal 
applications of the rewritable functionality; a cardholder could “rewrite the 
data on the magnetic stripe of a card she had no more use for to 
‘MYBANKACCOUNTPASSWORDIS78911Y783,’ so that she could 
recover her password in the event she forgot it.”130 
Her point is that police officers cannot know for sure what they are 
going to find when they skim the magstripe. It might be illegal, but it might 
not be. It could in fact be the kind of personal information that the Fourth 
Amendment was intended to protect. She goes further to say that, 
“individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy even in so-called 
single-purpose containers, ‘those rare containers’ whose ‘distinctive 
configuration . . . proclaims [their] content.’”131 Examples include things like 
“cereal boxes, guitar bags, gun cases, and the like.”132 In other words, it 
doesn’t matter if officers know what they are going to find in the container—
i.e., cereal—and that the possible exposure of information is limited. “The 
Fourth Amendment provides protection to the owner of every container that 
conceals its contents from plain view.”133 
Judge Kelly is not the only opponent of the judicial trend which 
proclaims no expectation of privacy in magstripes. Professor Orin Kerr has 
been very vocal in his belief that a reasonable expectation of privacy exists 
in the information encoded on a magstripe.134 In his opinion, swiping the 
magstripe “is a classic kind of Fourth Amendment search, retrieving 
information stored inside a storage device.”135 He sees it as irrelevant that the 
information typically matches what is on the outside of the card.136 Instead, 
he emphasizes one of the same points made by Judge Kelly—ultimately, 
police officers do not know what information they are going to find when 
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they swipe the card.137 Judge Kelly was particularly troubled by this point, as 
she said, “the results of a search cannot be used to justify its legality.”138 She 
continued, “[w]e have had frequent occasion to point out that a search is not 
to be made legal by what it turns up. In law it is good or bad when it starts 
and does not change character from its success.”139 As an example, she 
supplied that whether full of contraband or legitimate papers, once an officer 
opens a briefcase, a search has been conducted.140 
Professor Kerr continues on to examine the argument made by the 
majority in DE L’Isle, that there is no expectation of privacy because the card 
number is handed out every time the card is used.141 In his opinion, the 
situation is no different than if he is “working on a blog post from [his] laptop 
at home,” and the police want to hack into his laptop based solely on the fact 
that he “plan[s] to publish the post eventually.”142 In other words, whether 
information has been given out in the past, or would be given out in the 
future, does not defeat Fourth Amendment protection of that information at 
the present moment.143 
Following the Fifth Circuit’s holding that there is no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in a magstripe, Professor Kerr again sought to clarify 
two points of his argument.144 First, he argues that the decisions resting on 
the amount of information exposed are mistaken in their reasoning.145 He 
cites Arizona v. Hicks to show that the amount of information potentially 
exposed by the act should not be determinative. In Hicks, “[t]he officer’s act 
was not likely to reveal a lot of information, and the only information was 
the manufacturer’s information about the serial number.”146 Even here, where 
the exposure of information would be minimal, “the Court ruled that moving 
the turntable was a search.”147 Professor Kerr also uses this example to refute 
the argument regarding quality or type of information.148 In Hicks, the 
information at stake was a serial number—“just meaningless numbers 
assigned by a company that most users don’t know about and would never 
care to see.”149 In this respect, the information in Hicks contained even less 
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personal information than that which is at stake in the magstripe cases.150 His 
conclusion is that “like moving the turntable in Hicks, . . . scanning the 
magnetic stripe on the back of a card ‘expose[s] to view concealed portions 
of the [item] or its contents’ and is therefore a search.”151 
Professor Kerr’s second argument is that courts have misplaced their 
focus in these cases.152 In his opinion, rather than concerning themselves with 
the nature of the information obtained, they should be looking at the method 
used to obtain it—“forcibly exposing information from inside a person’s 
Fourth Amendment effects, which is as core of a search as you can get.”153 
His opinion is that the courts should be sticking to a bright-line rule in these 
situations—one that disregards how minimal the information accessed might 
be.154 
Whether on the side of the majority opinions in these cases, or on the 
side with Judge Kelly and Professor Kerr, it is clear that although there is not 
yet a circuit split, intelligent minds disagree regarding the privacy 
implications of these facts. Because of the factual similarities between the 
magstripe cases and the Emergency hypothetical case, whichever view is 
adopted in the magstripe cases will be highly indicative of how the 
Emergency case is decided. 
V.  ANALYSIS AND APPLICATION 
As of the writing of this Note, only one case has directly addressed 
the issue in question here. In State v. Hill, a Georgia police officer used a 
phone left in the back seat of a taxi cab to place a call out to 911.155  By doing 
so, he obtained the identifying information of the phone owner, Hill, who 
was subsequently charged with theft of services for fleeing the cab without 
paying his fare.156 This was done through the Emergency feature, and the 
passcode protected information on the phone was not accessed.157 Though 
the reasoning of that court differs from what has been set forth here, the 
conclusion is the same—the information obtained was not entitled to 
protection under the Fourth Amendment. The arguments made by that court 
are incorporated into this section. 
In line with the majority decision from DE L’Isle and the holding in 
Bah, courts should find that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
a phone number, such that a police officer’s use of the Emergency 
functionality of the phone to retrieve the number should not be considered a 
Fourth Amendment search for three reasons: (1) the quality and quantity of 
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the information exposed does not trigger Fourth Amendment protection, (2) 
it qualifies as a non-search under both the Jones test and (3) the Katz test.  
Moreover, even if a court were to find this action to be a search, it is possible 
that the warrant requirement would be waived through an application of the 
balancing test (weighing “the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s 
privacy and . . . the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of 
legitimate governmental interests”)158 or if it fell into one of the major 
exceptions to the warrant requirement. 
First, the quality and quantity of information accessed in this case do 
not rise to the level of being protected by the Fourth Amendment search 
requirements. It is important, before beginning the analysis, that 
consideration be given not only to the nature of the information being 
exposed, but also the manner in which it is being accessed. As stated 
previously, the Emergency functionality of the phone is accessible from the 
phone’s lock screen—without needing to enter or break the phone’s 
passcode. This is important because the data stored on the phone is not 
exposed to the person utilizing Emergency. The Emergency screen itself is a 
number pad from which any telephone number can be dialed—it is not 
restricted to dialing 911. None of the phone’s contacts are displayed. Under 
the proposed scenario, the only information accessible by a police officer is 
the telephone number associated with the cell phone. This would be achieved 
by dialing 911—the telephone number of the phone would display to the 911 
operator—and then the officer would communicate with the call center 
operator to get the number of the phone. 
It should be distinguished that the identity of the phone owner is not 
exposed throughout this process, only the telephone number associated with 
the phone. Should they choose to do so, police officers would be able, 
through the warrant process, to access the owner’s identity from the 
telephone service provider. 
But even if the owner’s identity was among the information to be 
exposed, the court in State v. Hill did not consider identifying information—
including things like phone number, name, and birthdate—to be among the 
types of information protected by the Fourth Amendment.159 Particularly, the 
court held “that [the defendant] had no legitimate expectation of privacy in 
this information.”160 The court went on to cite over a dozen cases from 
various jurisdictions indicating that this kind of information was not the kind 
“about which a person can have a reasonable expectation of privacy.”161 This 
categorical distinction of a class of identifying information which is not 
entitled to Fourth Amendment protection is in line with the Katz “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” test. However, this categorical exclusion is distinct 
from Katz analysis because it was not included in the original Katz case, and 
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has developed over time through various court decisions. Moreover, the court 
refused to extend Riley reasoning to the identifying information “simply 
because that information was associated with a cellular phone account rather 
than a landline phone account or a piece of physical mail.”162 
The Georgia Court of Appeals in Hill made a further distinction 
regarding the protections provided by the Fourth Amendment. Namely, the 
Court noted that, “although the content of personal communications is 
private, the information necessary to get those communications from point A 
to point B is not.”163 This is a significant point, and it stands in stark contrast 
to the view taken by Professor Kerr. The Georgia court focused very heavily 
on the quality of information that is being accessed, whereas Professor Kerr, 
and those who believe similarly, are concerned more about the method 
through which the information is obtained—“[c]alling 911 pushes out the 
number from the phone, and [Kerr thinks] that forced revealing of the number 
should count as a search of the phone.”164 
The Hill majority’s counterpoint to Kerr is that it simply does not 
matter that a police officer, rather than a private citizen, was the one doing 
the ‘forcing.’165 The court stated explicitly that this distinction “does not 
change our conclusion that the information was not subject to Fourth 
Amendment protection.”166 It went on to cite case law permitting government 
actors to take actions ranging from causing a cell phone to emit location 
information to removing the phone’s battery in order to obtain the serial 
number associated with the phone.167 In each of these cases, the reviewing 
court held that no search had taken place.168 
As an aside, also available in the Emergency screen is a Medical ID 
function. The Medical ID screen may include name and birthdate of the 
phone’s owner, emergency contacts, and medical allergy information, similar 
to a medical ID bracelet or necklace. The Fourth Amendment implications of 
this functionality lies beyond the scope of this Note, but it will suffice to say 
that the information included in the Medical ID section is loaded voluntarily 
by the owner for the sole purpose of being utilized by a third party for that 
owner’s benefit. 
How does the access to telephone number information square with 
the different Fourth Amendment search tests? Under the Jones analysis, 
assuming that the police are in lawful possession of the phone, accessing the 
Emergency function likely does not offend common-law trespass theory. 
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Looking strictly at the physical nature of the action, officers using their 
fingers to swipe and touch a glass screen does not rise to the same level of 
attaching a GPS monitoring device to someone’s car, as was the case in 
Jones.169 It would be much more akin to, though still not the same as, the 
officer’s actions in Hicks, where the officer moved stereo equipment in order 
to retrieve serial numbers of what he suspected to be stolen goods.170 The 
immediate hypothetical is distinguishable even from Hicks, in that Hicks still 
involved a physical moving of items and uncovering of information which 
the court determined was, 
[A] “search” separate and apart from the search for the 
shooter, victims, and weapons that was the lawful objective 
of his entry into the apartment. Merely inspecting those parts 
of the turntable that came into view during the latter search 
would not have constituted an independent search, because 
it would have produced no additional invasion of 
respondent’s privacy interest.171 
The violation committed by the officer in Hicks sounds in physical 
trespass. His lawful search gave him access to the apartment, but it did not 
give him the right to conduct “a ‘search’ separate and apart” from the lawful 
one.172 Hicks, while pre-dating Jones, and not a part of the Jones analysis, 
serves to show the high level of sensitivity with which trespass theory is 
applied to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
Clearly, the physical trespass reasoning is insufficient when dealing 
with modern technology. Many invasive searches can take place in today’s 
world without the government physically intruding upon anything. So, how 
does this action hold up under Katz analysis? 
First, is there a subjective expectation of privacy in the information 
accessed by Emergency? For the Katz court, it was enough to satisfy this test 
simply that Katz had shut the door to the telephone booth.173 That which he 
wanted to keep private was the sound of his words. Though he may have been 
plainly visible in the booth to anyone passing by, the action of closing the 
phone booth door indicated that he had a subjective expectation of privacy in 
the things that he said. This portion of the test is difficult to apply outside of 
a specific case, because the facts and people involved will most likely change 
the analysis, but it is fair to analogize the phone booth door to the iPhone 
lock screen. By creating a passcode and engaging the lock screen function, 
the user of a phone has asserted that the information behind that screen is 
private. By this analogy, anything in the phone which must be accessed by 
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inputting the passcode is entitled to a subjective expectation of privacy. But 
the instant case involves information and functionality which exists outside 
of that passcode barrier, and by that logic would not automatically be 
presumed to have a subjective expectation of privacy. 
Moreover, a user’s awareness of the Emergency function decreases 
that person’s subjective expectation of privacy. As it has been pointed out 
that the Government could “diminish each person’s expectation of privacy” 
by letting us all know that we are subject to constant surveillance, to the 
extent that an iPhone user is aware that his or her phone can be used to place 
an Emergency call without unlocking the passcode, he or she has lost the 
subjective expectation that it would not be used in this way. For these 
reasons, the Emergency function of the phone sits “outside the phone booth” 
and should not be afforded a subjective expectation of privacy. 
One critique of this position is that the Emergency functionality on 
the phone is not set up voluntarily by the phone’s owner. It is built into the 
operations of the phone. Yes, the case against a subjective expectation would 
be made much stronger if there were an opt-in or opt-out setting which each 
user could utilize or ignore at his or her preference. However, though the 
situation is not ideal, it is still fair to preclude smartphone users from 
asserting a subjective expectation of privacy in the phone’s Emergency 
functionality. 
Even if a particular user could establish a subjective expectation of 
privacy, Katz requires that it must be an expectation which “society is 
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”174 It is here where all of the modern 
computer, smartphone, and magstripe cases come into play. As Riley makes 
clear, our society is prepared to recognize an expansive privacy interest in 
smartphones for the simple reason that they are much more appropriately 
considered computers—which also happen to make phone calls.175 The 
information contained in smartphones touches nearly every aspect of a 
person’s life and, from the criminal’s perspective, can implicate someone of 
wrongdoing much faster and easier than a search of the most hidden spaces 
of his house. 
The critical point here is that this vast world of information contained 
in a smartphone is not compromised by the use of the Emergency function. 
It is unquestioned that an officer would need a warrant in order to penetrate 
to the actual substance of the device wherein all of the applications, emails, 
calendars, and messages are contained that implicate the deep privacy 
interest.176 But that is not happening here. The only information to be exposed 
by this search is a ten-digit number associated with the device. Justice 
Roberts’ vision of a person carting around a trunk full of all of their personal 
items is inapplicable to this limited use of the phone. 
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Furthermore, Riley’s broad recognition of privacy is not without 
limits. The Katz decision itself conceded that “[w]hat a person knowingly 
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of 
Fourth Amendment protection.”177 The magstripe cases keyed in on this 
reasoning in noting that a person has no privacy interest in the number 
programmed into the card because, “the purpose of [a card] is to enable the 
holder of the card to make purchases, and to accomplish this, the holder must 
transfer information form the card to the seller, which negates an expressed 
privacy interest.”178 
The court in Hill incorporated this reasoning into its decision, and it 
expounded, saying “[t]his rule applies even where the person revealing 
information intended its use by the third party to be limited.”179 The 
reasoning, according to the court is that, “[b]y using a phone, a person 
exposes identifying information to third parties, such as telephone 
companies, and assumes the risk that the telephone company may reveal that 
information to the government.”180 On this very narrow point, I disagree with 
the Hill majority. While I agree with the Court’s ultimate conclusion, its 
application of an assumption of the risk principle goes too far, and has far 
reaching privacy implications that the Court probably did not intend. The 
mere consumption of a product or service should not then entitle the 
providing company to disclose information about that consumption to the 
government. So, while the assumption of the risk argument can contribute to 
the analysis, it should not be alone sufficient to warrant government intrusion 
into an individual’s private information. 
The practical use of a telephone number bears great similarity to the 
number encoded on a credit card stripe. The purpose of a telephone number 
is to serve as a locator, allowing others to actively contact a phone’s user. 
Anytime a user places a call, his or her number is automatically given out to 
whoever the user is trying to contact—assuming the user is not utilizing an 
identity-blocking service. In fact, it is exactly that kind of information which 
someone “knowingly exposes to the public” every time they use their 
phone.181 
The force of the argument presented by Judge Kelly’s dissent in DE 
L’Isle is lessened when applied to telephone numbers, because the number 
associated with the phone is not manipulable in the same way that the number 
encoded in a credit card magstripe is manipulable. Judge Kelly was 
concerned by the similarities between the magstripe and a regular container, 
in which someone, through the process of re-encoding, could be storing their 
                                                 
 177. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
 178. DE L’Isle, 825 F.3d at 432. 
 179. Hill, 338 Ga. App. at 60 (citing United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 425 (4th 
Cir. 2016)). 
 180. Hill, 338 Ga. App. at 60. 
 181. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
334 BELMONT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5: 311 
password for an account or an admission of guilt to some crime.182 The 
information gathered by police officers when they use the Emergency 
function is nothing more than the ten-digit number associated with the phone. 
Finally, even if a court were to find that a search had taken place, it 
is possible that the warrant requirement would be waived. There are two main 
ways in which this can happen: (1) through an application of a balancing test 
which essentially weighs the individual’s privacy interest with legitimate 
governmental interests, or (2) if the facts of the case happen to fall within one 
of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. Regarding the first 
option, legitimate governmental interests commonly boil down to just two 
considerations—officer safety and the destruction of evidence.183 
Both of these possibilities involve heavily fact-based inquiries, and 
the benefit of trying to apply them here is minimal. However, there are some 
general observations that can be made regarding the interests of the balancing 
test. As argued above, it can be said that the individual privacy interest at 
stake is relatively small. As the court in Hill pointed out, many courts have 
held that general identifying information is not the kind in which an 
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy.184 It can also be said that 
the governmental interest is small, because it would be a rare circumstance 
for this narrow use of Emergency to implicate officer safety or an avoidance 
of the destruction of evidence. 
There is certainly not a clear-cut answer as to whether or not use of 
the Emergency function to retrieve a phone number would qualify as a 
search, but I believe that after consideration of the qualitative and 
quantitative factors of the information exposed, and an application of the 
Katz and Jones tests, this kind of action is not a search, and therefore no 
warrant should be required for police officers to make use of this tactic. 
Furthermore, it is possible that the warrant requirement would be waived 
even if this action was found to be a search. 
CONCLUSION 
The touchstone of Fourth Amendment applications begins and ends 
with reasonableness. True, there are certain bright-line rules giving definition 
to the concept of a search. But, barring a violation of those rules, judges must 
take into consideration all of the factors involved and make a decision which 
properly balances both the interests of individual privacy and the efficiency 
of police investigation. 
It is an oversimplification of the issue, and ignores the need for 
expedient investigation, to simply say police should be required to get a 
warrant in situations where the Emergency function is used. It is equally 
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dangerous to expand police power to conduct unwarranted activities which 
exist at the fringes of Fourth Amendment protection without justification. 
In this case, however, there is ample justification to allow police to 
utilize the Emergency feature of a smartphone without first obtaining a 
warrant in order to ascertain the identity of its owner. The quantity of 
information exposed is small; the information is limited to the ten digits 
which make up the associated telephone number. The number is not easily 
manipulable such that this portion of the device could be considered a 
container—no passwords or messages written by the phone’s owner will be 
discovered by the police officer’s call. Moreover, the quality of the 
information is not the kind to which courts have applied Fourth Amendment 
protection. As the Georgia court acknowledged in State v. Hill, basic 
identifying information such as name, age, and phone number is not the kind 
to which individuals are entitled a privacy interest. 
Additionally, the way in which the information is retrieved does not 
trigger Fourth Amendment protection. Previous cases have shown great 
concern for intrusions upon the data contained within a phone (typically 
protected by the phone’s passcode). In this case, the information gathered is 
all outside of the passcode’s protection, and does not invoke Riley protection 
because the “trunk” full of calendars, emails, communications, and internet 
history is not exposed to the officer in any way. 
Fourth Amendment protection is not implicated by an application of 
the Jones test. There is no physical intrusion into the phone, rather, contact 
with the phone is purely external in this situation. 
Nor is protection required under an application of the Katz test. A 
subjective expectation, though it may be able to be shown case to case, is 
difficult to prove, and ultimately less determinative of the issue than the 
objective requirement. From an objective standpoint, there are sufficient 
reasons to hold that an expectation of privacy in this information is not 
something which society is prepared to accept as reasonable. Among those 
are the Hill majority’s analysis of the kind of information at issue, and the 
fact that a telephone number is knowingly disclosed to third parties as a 
normal function of its use. 
For these reasons, police use of the Emergency function on a 
smartphone should not be considered a search under the Fourth Amendment, 
and therefore a warrant should not be required before a government actor is 
able to make use of the function. 
